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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Among the many proposals under consideration to control the growth in Medicare spending is one that 
attempts to achieve savings by restricting coverage under Medigap plans to require enrollees to pay a 
larger share of the costs of Medicare-covered services.  In 2008, about one in six Medicare beneficiaries, 
over 7 million, had an individually purchased Medicare supplemental insurance policy, known as 
Medigap (and no other source of supplemental coverage).1  Medicare by itself has relatively high 
deductibles, and imposes coinsurance for most covered services.  Moreover, Medicare does not have 
any limit on total cost sharing, exposing some beneficiaries to large out-of-pocket (OOP) costs.  Medigap 
policies help cover some or all of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements.  Some analysts contend that 
comprehensive “first dollar” coverage from Medigap leads enrollees to obtain unnecessary services, 
which results in excess Medicare spending.2
Various approaches to Medigap reform have been proposed in recent years, although they all involve 
higher cost sharing for enrollees.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has described an option that 
would prohibit Medigap policies from paying the first $550 of enrollees’ cost sharing and requiring that 
they cover no more than half of Medicare’s additional required cost sharing up to a fixed out-of-pocket 
limit.
   
3  CBO estimates this would produce savings of $3.7 billion in 2013 and $53.4 billion over the nine-
year period from 2013-2021.  Senators Joe Lieberman and Tom Coburn recently proposed a set of 
Medicare reforms that included a similar version of this option4, and the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform, known as the Bowles-Simpson Commission, also included a similar proposal 
in its set of recommendations released late last year.5  Another approach, suggested by the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), would require Medigap enrollees to pay fixed copayments 
(rather than coinsurance) for office and emergency room (ER) visits.6
This brief examines the potential effects of three different Medigap reform proposals on Medicare 
program spending and on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs (Exhibit ES1).   
 
Exhibit ES1:  Description of Medigap Reform Options in This Analysis 
 AMOUNT ENROLLEE PAYS AMOUNT MEDIGAP PAYS 
OPTION 1 
Based on CBO option; 
similar to Bowles-Simpson 
First $550 of any required cost sharing 
for services covered under Parts A or 
B; 50% of additional required cost 
sharing up to $3,025 limit on out-of-
pocket spending  
50% of required cost sharing after the 
first $550 paid by enrollee up to $3,025 
out-of-pocket spending limit; 100% of 
costs for Part A/B cost sharing above 
out-of-pocket limit 
OPTION 2 
Similar to Medigap Plan L,  
but more generous than 
Option 1 
25% of Part A deductible ($1,132 in 
2011); 100% of Part B deductible ($162 
in 2011); 25% of required cost sharing 
for Part A/B services up to $2,070 limit 
on out-of-pocket spending 
75% of Part A deductible; 
75% of A/B coinsurance up to $2,070 
out-of-pocket spending limit; 100% of 
costs for cost sharing above out-of-
pocket spending limit 
OPTION 3 
Similar to Medigap Plan N 
100% of Part B deductible; $20 per 
office visit; $50 per emergency room 
(ER) visit 
100% of Part A deductible and cost 
sharing for all other Medicare-covered 
services 
 
The analysis, based on data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and other sources, takes 
into account expected changes in utilization, and the likely effects of Medigap reforms on insurers’ costs 
for Medicare-covered services and on Medigap premiums.  The analysis assumes full implementation of 
Medigap reforms in 2011 to better understand the likely effects on program and out-of-pocket spending 
once fully implemented, although in all likelihood such a policy would be phased in over the course of 
several years. The analysis assumes no additional changes in the underlying Medicare benefit design.   
Medigap RefoRMs – potential effects of Benefit RestRictions on MedicaRe spending and BeneficiaRy costsii
ii 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Impact on Medicare Spending 
Each of the three Medigap reform options would be expected to achieve Medicare savings – primarily 
by inducing Medigap enrollees to curtail their use of Medicare-covered services, which in turn reduces 
federal Medicare spending (Exhibit ES2).  These estimates rely on specific assumptions (detailed in 
Appendix B) about how beneficiaries will respond to requirements that they pay more of the costs of 
services themselves.  If these predictions were wrong and beneficiaries continued to use services as they 
do today, there might be no savings for the Medicare program. 
Exhibit ES2:  Estimated Medicare Savings from Medigap Reform Options in This Analysis 
 OPTION 1 
Enrollees pay first $550 
in cost sharing for 
covered A/B services 
and 50% of additional 
required cost sharing up 
to $3,025 OOP limit 
OPTION 2 
Enrollees pay  
25% of Part A and 100% 
of Part B deductibles;  
25% of required cost 
sharing up to $2,070 
OOP limit  
OPTION 3 
Enrollees pay  
Part B deductible; 
copayments for physician 
visits and emergency  
room visits 
Medicare Savings, FY2011 $4.6 billion $2.3 billion $1.5 billion 
Savings as Share of 
Medicare Benefit Spending 
Under Parts A and B 
0.9% 0.5% 0.3% 
SOURCE:  Medicare savings based on author’s calculations, based on Part A and B spending for all Medicare beneficiaries. 
The first option, with a relatively high unified deductible for Parts A and B, and a limit on out-of-pocket 
spending, is estimated to reduce Medicare spending for Medigap enrollees by about 7 percent or $4.6 
billion dollars in fiscal 2011, reducing by 0.9 percent total spending for Medicare benefit payments 
under Parts A and B.  (CBO’s somewhat lower estimate for this option is chiefly because of different 
assumptions about how enrollees will change their use of services in response to higher cost sharing.)      
The second option would save about half that amount, because of its lower annual deductible and the 
lower limit on out-of-pocket spending.   The third option, with fixed cost sharing required for physician 
and ER visits, achieves smaller savings than the other two; it might deter some enrollees from initiating 
care, but would have little effect on use of services once care began. 
 
Impact on Beneficiary Spending 
This analysis estimates the effects of the three Medigap reforms on enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs, 
taking into account cost sharing for Medicare covered services (Parts A and B) and Medigap premiums.  
As Exhibit ES3 shows, most Medigap enrollees could see their direct costs rise as their Medigap policies 
become less generous, imposing higher deductibles and cost-sharing requirements.  Compared to the 
base case (with premiums and cost sharing based on Medigap Plan C benefit design), Medigap enrollees 
would face the largest average increase in their expected out-of-pocket costs for Medicare cost-sharing 
requirements under Option 1, as their cost sharing goes from $0 under the base case to $838 under 
Option 1.  Cost sharing would be lower under Options 2 and 3 ($443 and $242, respectively).   
 
However, as enrollees’ costs increase, Medigap insurers’ claims costs would drop, and insurers would be 
likely to reduce premiums.  When compared to the base case, enrollees would face the largest average 
reduction in their Medigap premium under Option 1, from $1,984 to $731.  If premium reductions were 
fully proportionate to the drop in expenses, the savings for the average beneficiary would be sufficient 
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to more than offset his or her new direct outlays for Medicare cost sharing.  However, the magnitude of 
change varies across the three options, with average reductions in combined premiums and cost sharing 
ranging from $415 under Option 1 to $190 under Option 2 and $78 under Option 3. 
$1,984
$731
$1,350
$1,663
$838
$443
$242
OPTION 3
Enrollees pay Part B 
deductible; copayments 
for physician visits and 
emergency room visits
OPTION 2
Enrollees pay 25% of 
Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1 
Enrollees pay first $550 in 
cost sharing for covered 
A/B services and 50% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
Expected Average Premium and Out-of-Pocket Costs For Medigap 
Enrollees, Under Base Case and Medigap Reform Options
Exhibit ES3
BASE CASE
Current Medigap 
rules based 
on Plan C 
benefit design
$1,568
$1,793
$1,905
NOTES: Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding
Cost Sharing Paid by Enrollee
Medigap Premium
 
 
Under all three options, the majority of Medigap enrollees are projected to see a reduction in net out-
of-pocket costs (including premiums), but about one in five Medigap enrollees would pay more  
(Exhibit ES4).   
Share of Medigap Enrollees, by Change in Expected Premium 
and Out-of-Pocket Costs Under Medigap Reform Options
21% 36%
19%
14%
39%
6%
7%
20%
77%
8%
16%
16%
6%
5%
1%
8%
2%
79% 21%
78% 22%
83% 17%
 > $1,000 decrease 
$500-$999 
decrease 
$250-$499 
decrease 
$1-$249 
decrease 
$1-$499 
increase 
$500-$999 
increase 
> $1,000 
increase
OPTION 3: Enrollees pay 
Part B deductible; 
copayments for physician 
visits and emergency 
room visits
OPTION 2: Enrollees pay 
25% of Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
Cost reduction Cost increase
Exhibit ES4
OPTION 1: Enrollees pay first 
$550 in cost sharing for 
covered A/B services and 50% 
of required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
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Some Medigap policy holders are projected to have fairly substantial reductions in net out-of-pocket 
spending.  In 2011, about one in five Medigap policy holders would see net out-of-pocket spending drop 
by $1,000 or more under Option 1 and by $500-$999 under Option 2, with more modest savings 
projected under Option 3.   
 
A small number of enrollees could see equally large increases in out-of-pocket spending attributable to 
these reforms.  For example, net out-of-pocket costs would increase by $1,000 or more for 8 percent of 
Medigap enrollees under Option 1, and another 6 percent would see cost increases of between $500 
and $999.  Under Option 2, 7 percent of Medigap enrollees would have cost increases of $500 or more.  
With the third option, the majority of those with cost increases would see costs increase between $1 
and $500.  
 
Medigap reforms would have a disproportionately negative impact on enrollees with modest incomes, 
in relatively poor health, and those with any inpatient hospital utilization (Exhibit ES5).  Under all three 
options, a greater share of beneficiaries reporting fair or poor health than those in better health would 
experience an increase in total out-of-pocket costs, because their premium savings would not be 
enough to offset their new spending for direct cost-sharing.  Under Options 1 and 2, more than one-
third of all Medigap enrollees in fair or poor health would experience a net increase in premiums and 
other out-of-pocket costs for Medicare covered services, as compared to less than one-fifth of those in 
relatively good health.  Because those in relatively poor health use more services than healthier 
enrollees, the increase in their direct cost-sharing expenses for Medicare-covered services would more 
than offset any premium reduction. 
 
Similarly, a greater share of Medigap enrollees with incomes below 300 percent of the federal poverty 
level than of those with higher incomes would experience an increase in out-of-pocket spending.  About 
one quarter of Medigap enrollees with incomes below 300 percent of poverty are projected to face 
higher costs under these options—a much higher share than among Medigap enrollees with higher 
incomes.   
Share of Medigap Enrollees By Change in Expected Premium and 
Out-of-Pocket Costs Under Medigap Reform Option 1, 
by Health Status, Income, and Inpatient Use
79%
83%
63%
75%
76%
87%
86%
87%
34%
21%
17%
37%
25%
24%
13%
14%
13%
66%
Exhibit ES5
Health 
Status
Federal 
Poverty 
Level 
(FPL)
Excellent/very good/
good
Fair/poor
TOTAL
Percent with cost reduction Percent with cost increase
Under 200% FPL
200% - 299% FPL
300% - 399% FPL
400% FPL and over
NOTE: Under Option 1, Medigap enrollees pay the first $550 in cost sharing for covered A/B services and 50% of cost sharing up to $3,025 out-
of-pocket limit.
Inpatient 
Use 
During 
Year
No admissions
One or more admissions
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DISCUSSION 
 
As policymakers consider Medigap reforms as part of a broader strategy to reduce the growth in 
Medicare spending, this analysis shows that restrictions on Medigap coverage can be expected to 
reduce both Medicare spending and net average out-of-pocket spending, including cost sharing and 
Medigap premiums, for most but not all Medigap enrollees.  Whatever the possible role of 
comprehensive Medigap policies in encouraging higher utilization, they have also served to spread the 
risks for enrollees with chronic illness or high-cost events.  Changes in Medigap could expose about one 
in five Medigap enrollees to higher out-of-pocket costs, and these increases would disproportionately 
affect policyholders in relatively poor heath and with modest incomes. 
 
Moreover, the savings that could accrue to Medicare, and some of the net savings for Medigap 
enrollees, would result from reductions in medical service utilization, as beneficiaries have more “skin in 
the game”.  There is no way of ensuring that enrollees who might reduce their utilization would forgo 
only services of questionable value.  On the contrary, at least one study suggests that enrollees with 
chronic conditions could defer necessary services—perhaps leading in the long run to even higher 
costs.7
 
 Thus, it is important to emphasize that this analysis does not assess the extent to which the likely 
reduction in service utilization could negatively affect patient outcomes or result in higher costs.    
Beyond the distributional effects and the potential for adverse health outcomes, there are other 
questions that could arise if Medigap reforms are considered.   Should similar rules be applied to other 
sources of supplemental coverage, such as employer-sponsored benefits for Medicare-eligible retirees 
or Medicare Advantage plans?  How does increased cost sharing work with proposals to move away 
from fee-for-service payment under Medicare, such as bundled payments or shared savings with 
accountable care organizations?  Changes in Medigap plan designs should be considered in the context 
of a broader reevaluation of the structure of Medicare benefits and a possible realignment of overall 
financial incentives for both providers and beneficiaries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicare beneficiaries are subject to cost sharing—deductibles or coinsurance payments—for most 
covered services, but unlike most private insurance plans for the nonelderly, Medicare does not have an 
“out-of-pocket limit.”  Under typical employer plans, once the enrollee’s cost-sharing liability has 
exceeded a specified threshold, the plan usually pays the full cost of covered services.   Medicare 
beneficiaries have no such protection; if they have a costly medical problem, they can be exposed to 
very large out-of-pocket expenditures.  In 2008, six percent of Medicare beneficiaries incurred cost 
sharing of $5,000 or more for their Medicare-covered services.8
 
 
As a result, most beneficiaries obtain additional coverage to help with some or all of Medicare’s 
required cost sharing (Exhibit 1).  In 2008, 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had some form of 
supplemental coverage.9  Employer-sponsored retiree health plans are the primary source of 
supplemental coverage, providing additional coverage to one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries, 
typically those with relatively high incomes.  Medicaid is an important source of supplemental coverage 
for beneficiaries with very low-incomes.  Others get additional benefits by enrolling in Medicare 
Advantage (MA) plans, which provide basic Medicare benefits and typically some amount of 
supplemental coverage.  Roughly one in six beneficiaries has an individually-purchased Medicare 
supplemental policy, known as Medigap.10
 
 
 
 
Medigap plans vary in the extent to which they fill in Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements.  In 2011, 
beneficiaries could choose from among 10 standard Medigap policies to supplement their coverage 
under fee-for-service Medicare.  The most popular Medigap plans, C and F, cover virtually all required 
Medicare cost sharing for Medicare-covered services, including deductibles, meaning that covered 
services are essentially free to the enrollee.  (See Appendix Exhibits A1 and A2 for standard Medigap 
plans and distribution of Medigap policyholders by plan type.) 
Sources of Supplemental Coverage Among 
Medicare Beneficiaries, 2008
Total Medicare Beneficiaries, 2008 = 41.8 Million
NOTES: Supplemental coverage was assigned in the following order: 1) Medicare Advantage, 2) Medicaid, 3) Employer, 4) Medigap, 5) Other 
public/private coverage, 6) No supplemental coverage.  Individuals with more than one source of coverage were assigned to the category that 
appears highest in the ordering. 
SOURCE: Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of the CMS Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey Access to Care File, 2008.
Employer-
Sponsored 
Coverage
33%
Medicare 
Advantage
24%
Medicaid
15%
Medigap
17%
Other Public / 
Private 
Coverage
1%
No 
Supplemental 
Coverage
10%
Exhibit 1
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Several studies have found that beneficiaries with comprehensive Medigap plans (“first dollar” 
coverage) use more Medicare services than those who have to pay some or all of Medicare’s cost 
sharing on their own.11
 
  Estimates of the size of this spending gap vary, and analysts disagree about why 
Medicare spending for Medigap enrollees is higher than for other beneficiaries, after controlling for 
health status and other factors.  Some analysts suggest that people who expect to incur large expenses 
are more likely to buy a Medigap plan than to go without a Medicare supplement.  Others say that 
Medigap encourages people to obtain services of marginal utility because they do not have to bear the 
cost out of their own pockets.  (Physicians may also consider patients’ supplemental coverage when 
ordering services.)  To the extent it occurs, higher use may be attributable to both factors.   
The current debate about how to control the growth in Medicare spending has brought renewed 
attention to the possible role of Medigap in driving program costs.  A number of recent deficit reduction 
plans have included proposals to restrict Medigap coverage.  For example, the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, also known as the Bowles-Simpson Commission, would prohibit 
Medigap policies from covering the first $500 of cost sharing, and impose 50 percent coinsurance on the 
next $5,000 in total spending, before providing a catastrophic benefit.12  In general, these proposals 
would prohibit first-dollar coverage, requiring policyholders to pay at least some of Medicare’s usual 
cost sharing for covered services.13
 
  Proponents of this approach suggest that enrollees would use fewer 
services, producing measurable savings for the Medicare program.  At the same time, most enrollees 
could benefit, because first-dollar coverage is not a good bargain for many beneficiaries. 
This brief reviews the potential effects of imposing restrictions on Medigap coverage, using a simplified 
model based on data from the 2006 Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey and other sources.  Three 
different options for benefit redesign are considered, including two that require substantial cost sharing 
for most inpatient and outpatient services and one that requires more limited cost sharing for 
ambulatory care only.  For each option, the modeling estimates how the policy changes might affect 
beneficiary behavior, federal Medicare spending, and Medigap enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs for 
Medicare-covered services and Medigap premiums, and which beneficiaries are likely to face higher or 
lower total out-of-pocket-costs than under their current plans. 
Medicare Cost Sharing and Medigap Plans 
 
This section provides a brief overview of Medicare cost-sharing requirements and an overview of 
benefits and other provisions pertaining to Medigap plans.  
 
Medicare Cost Sharing 
Medicare benefits are subject to deductibles and cost sharing.  Beneficiaries are subject to a deductible 
($1,132 in 2011) before receiving Medicare payment for inpatient hospital care under Part A and a 
separate $162 deductible for the physician and outpatient services covered under Part B.  They must pay 
a daily coinsurance amount for long inpatient stays and a fixed daily copayment for days 21 through 100 
in skilled nursing facilities.  In addition, they are required to pay coinsurance for most Part B services, 
usually 20 percent of Medicare’s total approved amount for those services.14
 
  More detailed information 
about Medicare benefits and cost sharing is included in Appendix Exhibit A3. 
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Medigap Plans 
About one in six people on Medicare is covered by a Medigap policy that supplements the fee-for-
service Medicare program.  All Medigap plans offered by insurance carriers must conform to one of the 
standardized designs developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).15  The 
list of standard plans has been modified several times, most recently in 2010.  Currently, there are 10 
standard plans, designated as Plan A through Plan N (some letters are no longer in use).  All of these 
packages provide a minimum set of basic benefits, including coverage of some or all of Medicare’s 
inpatient hospital coinsurance and Part B coinsurance.  In 2009, 88 percent of people covered by 
standardized plans were in plans that covered 100 percent of Medicare’s required deductibles and 
coinsurance, or all except the Part B deductible.16
 
 
Medigap Premiums and Loss Ratios 
Insurers set premiums for Medigap plans in one of three ways: 
 
• Attained age:  The premium rises as the policyholder gets older. 
• Issue age:  The premium is based on the policyholder’s age when he or she first buys coverage.  Any 
increases for rising medical costs or other factors are applied equally to all policyholders. 
• Community rating:  All policyholders pay the same amount, again subject to increases for group-
wide cost increases. 
 
Under attained age rating, purchasers may have a low premium rate when they first buy the coverage, 
but the rate can rise steeply as they age.  Under issue age or community rating, purchasers will pay a 
higher initial rate, but are shielded to some extent from rate increases later on.  Although a few states 
require issue age or community rating, attained age rating is much more common.  The modeling for 
this brief therefore assumes attained age rates for all participants. 
 
Medigap plans must meet minimum “loss ratio” tests or provide rebates to enrollees.  The loss ratio is 
the proportion of premium revenues that is spent for medical claims.  For example, a plan with an 80 
percent loss ratio pays out 80 cents of every premium dollar for medical services and retains 20 cents for 
administrative costs and profit.  Medigap plans sold to individuals must have at least a 65 percent loss 
ratio, while those sold to employer groups (for retiree coverage) must have a 75 percent ratio.  This rule 
applies to all the purchasers of a given policy combined, and over the lifetime of the policy—not to any 
particular purchaser or any one year. 
 
Medigap Reform Options 
 
Most of the discussion of Medigap in the context of deficit reduction has focused on proposals that 
would require all enrollees in Medigap plans to pay at least some deductible and coinsurance on their 
own, up to a specified out-of-pocket (OOP) limit, and would prohibit first-dollar coverage.  There have 
also been suggestions that enrollees should pay copayments, instead of coinsurance, for some 
ambulatory services, as is common in most private non-Medicare plans.  This brief considers both of 
these approaches to prohibiting first-dollar coverage, along with a third option that would prohibit first-
dollar coverage for Part B services only and impose less stringent deductible and coinsurance 
requirements than those commonly suggested. 
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OPTION 1:  Require Medigap enrollees to pay the first $550 in cost sharing for services 
covered under Medicare Parts A and B, and then 50 percent of required cost sharing up to an 
out-of-pocket limit of $3,025 
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in its periodic compendium of options for reducing the federal 
deficit, has described one possible redesign of Medigap benefits to achieve Medicare/federal savings.  
Under this proposal, beginning in 2013, Medigap policies would be prohibited from covering the first 
$550 in Medicare cost sharing.  Once this threshold was reached, enrollees would pay 50 percent of 
required cost sharing and their Medigap plan would pay 50 percent until total costs reached $5,500.  At 
that point, the Medigap plan would pay any additional cost sharing in full.  The most an enrollee would 
be required to pay out-of-pocket would be $3,025.  For later years, the threshold and out-of-pocket limit 
would be increased in proportion to growth in per capita Medicare spending.   
 
CBO estimates that this plan would reduce Medicare spending by $3.7 billion in 2013 and $53.4 billion in 
the nine-year period from 2013 to 2021.17  MedPAC has estimated that applying these same rules to 
employer-provided retiree coverage, in addition to Medigap, would more than double these savings.18
 
   
A similar plan is included in the Medicare reform proposal from Senators Joe Lieberman and Tom 
Coburn, but in this plan the catastrophic limit would be $7,500 rather than $5,500.19  A similar approach 
is also included in the Bowles-Simpson Commission final report and in a separate Medicare/Medicaid 
redesign proposal presented by two of the commission members, Rep. Paul Ryan and former CBO 
director Alice Rivlin.20
 
  The Medigap rules suggested in both plans are the same as those in the CBO plan, 
except that enrollees would pay the first $500 in cost sharing and then pay 50 percent of total costs up 
to a catastrophic limit of $5,000.  (In the Rivlin-Ryan plan, these rules would apply to beneficiaries 
enrolling in Medicare before 2021; new beneficiaries beginning in 2021 would not receive traditional 
Medicare, but would be enrolled in a voucher or premium support system.) 
OPTION 2:  Require Medigap enrollees to pay 25 percent of the Part A deductible, 100 
percent of the Part B deductible, and 25 percent of required cost sharing up to an out-of-
pocket limit of $2,070 
 
Under this option, Medigap enrollees would be shifted to a plan resembling Medigap Plan L, one of the 
standard benefit designs currently available.  Enrollees would pay 25 percent of the inpatient (Part A) 
deductible, 100 percent of the Part B deductible, and 25 percent of all required coinsurance, up to an 
annual out of-pocket limit of $2,070.   This option is presented to illustrate a midpoint between current 
comprehensive Medigap benefits and the sharply reduced benefits under Option 1. 
 
OPTION 3:  Require Medigap enrollees to pay the Part B deductible (but not Part A 
deductible), plus $20 copayments for physician office visits and $50 emergency room visits 
 
The 2010 health reform law, the Patient and Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), requires that the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) request NAIC to update the standards for the most 
popular Medigap plans, C and F, “to include requirements for nominal cost sharing to encourage the use 
of appropriate physicians’ services under Part B.”21
 
   The new standards would apply to policies sold in 
2015 or later. 
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The copayment approach is already included in one of the new Medigap options first offered in 2010, 
Plan N.  This plan covers all cost sharing except the Part B deductible, but requires copayments for office 
visits with physicians or other practitioners and for emergency room visits.  Copayments are set at the 
lesser of the coinsurance that would ordinarily apply for these services or $20 per office visit and $50 
per emergency room visit.   MedPAC has suggested that all Medigap plans could be required to include 
similar copayments, except that the office visit copayment would be $10 for primary care and $25 for 
specialist visits. 
 
The modeling in this brief assumes that under Option 3, all Medigap enrollees shift to a plan comparable 
to Medigap Plan N, without a distinction between primary care and specialist visits.22
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Data and Assumptions 
Data used in the modeling for this brief are derived from the 2006 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  The MEPS interviews a nationally 
representative sample of households and collects information on demographic characteristics, health 
status, use of medical services, charges and payments for care, health insurance coverage, and other 
characteristics.  The MEPS data have been adjusted using information from several other sources.  The 
following is a summary of a few key assumptions used in the modeling.   A fuller explanation of the 
model is provided in Appendix B. 
• The population includes all Medicare beneficiaries who had individually purchased Medigap in 2006 
and who were not enrolled in Medicaid, an employer plan, or a Medicare Advantage plan during the 
year.  It is assumed that none of the Medigap subscribers drop coverage or change to some other 
form of supplement. 
• Medicare-approved amounts and Medicare payments are updated to fiscal year 2011, using data 
from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and CBO. 
• The model measures the effects of policy options relative to a “base case.”  In the base case, all 
beneficiaries with Medigap coverage have at least Plan C, which provides first dollar coverage for 
services provided under Parts A and B and covers coinsurance for virtually all services.  
• Estimated premiums for Medigap coverage, in the base case and under each of the policy options, 
are equal to expected claims costs for the cost sharing covered by the policy, plus an administrative 
add-on.  For all options, the plan is assumed to have a medical loss ratio of 77.5 percent, the 
national average for established policies in the individual market in 2009.  As is common in the 
Medigap market, premiums are based on attained age, with older beneficiaries paying more. 
• Estimates of spending by Medicare, Medigap carriers, and beneficiaries include only spending for 
services under Parts A and B; spending for Part D (prescription drug) benefits is omitted. 
 
Changes in Medigap rules would affect Medicare spending only if beneficiaries responded to these 
changes by using fewer covered services or less costly services.  Unfortunately, there is no reliable way 
of estimating how a given policy will affect care-seeking behavior.  Instead, analysis must rely on more 
or less arbitrary guesses.  Different behavioral assumptions would affect estimated per beneficiary costs 
for Medicare and for enrollees.  The analysis here uses a set of factors that assumes that lower-income 
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beneficiaries would be more likely to curtail their utilization than higher-income ones.  How the results 
might be affected by different behavioral assumptions is discussed later in this paper. 
 
In addition, the analysis assumes: (1) full implementation of the policy in 2011 to assess the full effect, 
although most proposals would allow for a longer transition; (2) no increase or decrease in the number 
of Medigap policyholders (which would potentially increase or decrease the Medicare savings); and (3) 
no change in the underlying structure of the Medicare benefit (although several current proposals 
would couple Medigap reform with benefit restructuring under the fee-for-service program).    
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Effects on Aggregate Medicare and Beneficiary Costs 
Exhibits 2 and 3 compare the effects of the three policy options on Medicare spending and beneficiary 
costs.  To allow for comparison of the different options, all of the estimates in this and the next section 
are based on the assumption of income-based behavioral changes in response to the Medigap changes.  
These should be regarded as high-end estimates of potential Medicare savings and of net gains for 
typical beneficiaries.   
 
Option 1 provides the largest savings for Medicare and for the average enrollee, while Option 3 has 
much less impact (Exhibit 3).  Under Option 3, enrollees would have to pay only the $162 Part B 
deductible and fixed copayments for office and emergency room visits.  While these cost-sharing 
requirements might deter initiation of an episode of care, they would not have much effect on use of 
services once care began.  Option 2—the Medigap Plan L package—falls midway between the other two.  
Its cost-sharing requirements are less stringent than under Option 1, and its out-of-pocket limit is lower.  
Unlike Option 3, it requires some cost sharing for all services subject to cost sharing under ordinary 
Medicare rules. 
 
Exhibit 2:  Changes in Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary and Average Beneficiary Costs under 
Three Medigap Benefit Options 
 BASE 
CASE 
OPTION 1 
First $550 in cost 
sharing for covered 
A/B services; 50% of 
additional required 
cost sharing up to 
$3,025 OOP limit 
OPTION 2 
25% of Part A and 
100% of Part B 
deductibles;  25% 
of required cost 
sharing up to 
$2,070 OOP limit  
OPTION 3 
Part B 
deductible; 
copayments 
for physician 
visits and ER 
visits 
(a) Medicare-approved amounts (=b+c) $9,262 $8,550 $8,922 $9,066 
(b) Medicare payments $7,724 $7,146 $7,432 $7,536 
(c) Required cost sharing (=d+e) $1,537 $1,404 $1,490 $1,531 
(d) Paid by Medigap $1,537 $566 $1,047 $1,289 
(e) Paid by enrollee  $0 $838 $443 $242 
(f) Medigap premium (=d/.775) $1,984 $731 $1,350 $1,663 
(e) Combined premium and OOP cost (=e+f) $1,984 $1,568 $1,793 $1,905 
(g) Average enrollee savings from base case n/a $415 $190 $78 
Medicare savings in FY 2011 (in billions) n/a -$4.60 -$2.32 -$1.50 
As percent of Part A and Part B benefit 
spending (including spending for non-
Medigap beneficiaries) 
n/a 0.9% 0.5% 0.3% 
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Estimated Medicare and Enrollee Payments 
Under Medigap Reform Options
$7,724
$7,146
$7,432
$7,536
$1,984
$1,568
$1,793
$1,905
Medicare payments Enrollee premiums and cost sharing
Exhibit 3
BASE CASE: 
Current Medigap rules based 
on Plan C benefit design
$9,708
$8,714
$9,225
$9,441
OPTION 3: Enrollees pay 
Part B deductible; 
copayments for physician 
visits and emergency 
room visits
OPTION 2: Enrollees pay 
25% of Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1: Enrollees pay 
first $550 in cost sharing for 
covered A/B services and 50%
of required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
 
 
As Exhibit 4 shows, most Medigap enrollees could see their direct costs rise as their Medigap policies 
become less generous, imposing higher deductibles and cost-sharing requirements.  Compared to the 
base case (with premiums and cost sharing based on Medigap Plan C benefit design), Medigap enrollees 
would face the largest average increase in their expected out-of-pocket costs for Medicare cost-sharing 
requirements under Option 1, as their cost sharing goes from $0 under the base case to $838 under 
Option 1.  Cost sharing would be lower under Options 2 and 3 ($443 and $242, respectively).   
$1,984
$731
$1,350
$1,663
$838
$443
$242
OPTION 3
Enrollees pay Part B 
deductible; copayments 
for physician visits and 
emergency room visits
OPTION 2
Enrollees pay 25% of 
Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1 
Enrollees pay first $550 in 
cost sharing for covered 
A/B services and 50% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
Expected Average Premium and Out-of-Pocket Costs For Medigap 
Enrollees, Under Base Case and Medigap Reform Options
Exhibit 4
BASE CASE
Current Medigap 
rules based 
on Plan C 
benefit design
$1,568
$1,793
$1,905
NOTES: Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.
Cost Sharing Paid by Enrollee
Medigap Premium
 
Medigap RefoRMs – potential effects of Benefit RestRictions on MedicaRe spending and BeneficiaRy costs8
8 
 
However, as enrollees’ costs rise, Medigap insurers’ claims costs would drop, and insurers would be 
likely to reduce premiums.  When compared to the base case, enrollees would face the largest average 
reduction in their Medigap premium under Option 1, from $1,984 to $731.  If premium reductions were 
fully proportionate to the drop in expenses, the savings for the average beneficiary would be sufficient 
to more than offset his or her new direct outlays for Medicare cost sharing.  However, the magnitude of 
change varies across the three options, with average reductions in combined premiums and cost sharing 
ranging from $415 under Option 1 to $190 under Option 2 and $78 under Option 3. 
As noted earlier, the premium estimates here assume that policies under both the base case and Option 
1 have a loss ratio of 77.5 percent, which is substantially higher than the 65 percent required by law.  
This analysis assumes that insurers would pass their savings from reduced claims costs to enrollees to 
retain market share.  However, the impact of reduced claims on premiums could be limited by other 
factors.  Many enrollees are effectively locked into their current carrier because they might not pass 
medical underwriting tests for a new policy.  Carriers could hold onto these enrollees even if they did 
not share savings.  Moreover, it is unlikely that insurers’ administrative costs would drop in direct 
proportion to reduced utilization.  There might be somewhat fewer individual claims from enrollees, 
reducing claims processing costs.  But other components of administration, such as marketing and 
premium collection, would not be affected at all.   
In sum, the premium estimates presented here may be optimistic.  But even in the worst case, with loss 
ratios dropping to the minimum required 65 percent, most enrollees would still see a net savings.  
Under Option 1, for example, the average premium would go from $731 to $871 with the lower loss 
ratio.  But this would still translate into average premium savings of $1,113 from the base-case premium 
($1,984), more than enough to offset the increased cost sharing. 
 
Average Cost Increases and Reductions Among Medigap Enrollees  
Under all three options, the average beneficiary would see some cost savings.  But there are winners 
and losers under each option, as Exhibits 5 and 6 show.   
Share of Medigap Enrollees, by Change in Expected Premium 
and Out-of-Pocket Costs Under Medigap Reform Options
21% 36%
19%
14%
39%
6%
7%
20%
77%
8%
16%
16%
6%
5%
1%
8%
2%
79% 21%
78% 22%
83% 17%
 > $1,000 decrease 
$500-$999 
decrease 
$250-$499 
decrease 
$1-$249 
decrease 
$1-$499 
increase 
$500-$999 
increase 
> $1,000 
increase
Cost reduction Cost increase
Exhibit 5
OPTION 3: Enrollees pay 
Part B deductible; 
copayments for physician 
visits and emergency 
room visits
OPTION 2: Enrollees pay 
25% of Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1: Enrollees pay first 
$550 in cost sharing for 
covered A/B services and 50% 
of required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
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About 4 out of 5 enrollees would have lower combined premium and out-of-pocket costs under each 
option than under the base case, while 1 in 5 would see higher costs.  But the magnitude of the effects is 
very different under Option 1 than under the other two.  Under Option 1, 14 percent of enrollees would 
see their costs increase by $500 or more, while 57 percent would have cost reductions of $500 or more.  
Under Options 2 and 3, on the other hand, most enrollees have more modest gains or losses. 
Average Change in Expected Premium and Out-of-Pocket 
Costs For Medigap Enrollees Under Medigap Reform Options
-$749
-$364
-$115
$806
$411
$102
Exhibit 6
Average cost reduction Average cost increase
% with reduction % with increase
79% 21%
78% 22%
83% 17%
OPTION 3: Enrollees pay 
Part B deductible; 
copayments for physician 
visits and emergency 
room visits
OPTION 2: Enrollees pay 
25% of Part A and 100% of 
Part B deductibles; 25% of 
required cost sharing up to 
$2,070 out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1: Enrollees pay first 
$550 in cost sharing for 
covered A/B services and 50% 
of required cost sharing up to 
$3,025 out-of-pocket limit
 
Many beneficiaries use comparatively few Medicare services during a year and thus would pay little or 
no cost sharing under any of the options, but they would benefit from Medigap premium reductions.  
Enrollees with lower Medicare spending are expected to see average net savings, while those with 
higher Medicare spending would face higher average net costs under these reform options (Exhibit 7). 
-$415
-$190
-$78
-$1,038
-$481
-$192
-$975
-$438
-$112
-$711
-$357
-$72
-$309
-$156
-$39
$274
$171
-$21
$1,195
$616
$25
All Under $500 $500-$999 $1,000-$4,999 $5,000-$9,999 $10,000-$24,999 $25,000 or more
OPTION 3: Enrollees pay Part B 
deductible; copayments for physician 
visits and emergency room visits
OPTION 2: Enrollees pay 25% of Part A 
and 100% of Part B deductibles; 25% 
of required cost sharing up to $2,070 
out-of-pocket limit
OPTION 1: Enrollees pay first $550 in 
cost sharing for covered A/B services 
and 50% of required cost sharing up 
to $3,025 out-of-pocket limit
Average Change in Expected Premium and Out-of-Pocket Costs 
For Medigap Enrollees Under Medigap Reform Options, 
by Enrollees’ Medicare Spending Level Before Reform
Exhibit 7
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Effects on Medigap Enrollees by Beneficiary Characteristics 
Exhibits 8 and 9 show Medigap enrollees who would experience changes in cost under the three 
different reform options by enrollee characteristics, including health status, age, income, and use of 
inpatient hospital services.   
Share of Medigap Enrollees By Change in Expected Premium and 
Out-of-Pocket Costs Under Medigap Reform Option 1, 
by Health Status, Income, and Inpatient Use
79%
83%
63%
75%
76%
87%
86%
87%
34%
21%
17%
37%
25%
24%
13%
14%
13%
66%
Exhibit 8
Health 
Status
Federal 
Poverty 
Level 
(FPL)
Excellent/very good/
good
Fair/poor
TOTAL
Percent with cost reduction Percent with cost increase
Under 200% FPL
200% - 299% FPL
300% - 399% FPL
400% FPL and over
NOTE: Under Option 1, Medigap enrollees pay the first $550 in cost sharing for covered A/B services and 50% of cost sharing up to the $3,025 
out-of-pocket limit.
Inpatient 
Use 
During 
Year
No admissions
One or more admissions
 
 
A greater share of Medigap enrollees reporting fair or poor health would see their costs increase under 
each option.  Because they tend to have higher spending, they would pay more under the new cost-
sharing rules.  On the other hand, for those in the same age bracket, while their premiums would go 
down, the reductions would be the same for everyone, regardless of health status or utilization.  For 
sicker enrollees, the uniform premium changes would be less likely to offset the new cost sharing. 
 
A greater share of enrollees with low incomes than those with higher incomes would see cost increases 
under each of the options.  This may be related to, but not primarily a function of, health status, since 
enrollees’ reported health is not strongly correlated with income.  It is possible that low-income 
beneficiaries who choose to devote some of their more limited resources to purchase Medigap have a 
higher propensity to use services than higher-income enrollees.  Whatever the explanation, it appears 
that any Medigap restrictions would be somewhat more burdensome for lower-income Medigap 
purchasers.23
 
 
Finally, enrollees who receive inpatient hospital care would be far more likely than others to see net cost 
increases under Options 1 and 2, because they would have to pay part of the inpatient deductible, the 
most costly single component of Medicare cost sharing.  This would not be true if cost sharing led some 
of these enrollees to decline an elective hospital admission.  (The analysis here models changes in 
overall spending, but not in use of specific types of services.) 
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Exhibit 9:  Percent of Medigap Enrollees with a Net Cost Increase under Medigap Benefit 
Options, by Beneficiary Characteristics 
 OPTION 1 
Enrollees pay first 
$550 in cost sharing 
for covered A/B 
services and 50% of 
additional required 
cost sharing up to 
$3,025 OOP limit 
OPTION 2 
Enrollees pay  
25% of Part A and 
100% of Part B 
deductibles;  
25% of required 
cost sharing up to 
$2,070 OOP limit  
OPTION 3 
Enrollees pay  
Part B deductible; 
copayments for 
physician visits and 
emergency  
room visits 
Reported health status 
Good, very good, or excellent 17% 18% 14% 
Fair or poor 37% 39% 26% 
Age* 
65-74 21% 21% 18% 
75-84 22% 22% 16% 
85 and older 21% 25% 14% 
Family income as a percent of poverty 
Under 200% 25% 28% 16% 
200%-299% 24% 23% 25% 
300%-399% 13% 15% 10% 
400% and over 14% 13% 12% 
Inpatient hospital use during year 
No inpatient admission  13% 13% 14% 
One or more inpatient admissions 66% 72% 31% 
Total 21% 22% 17% 
NOTE: *Only about 275,000 people with individual Medigap were under age 65. This sample is too small for meaningful 
analysis.  However, nonelderly enrollees are included in the numbers for health status and income and in the totals 
 
Are the Medicare Savings Real?   
The modeling here assumes that Medigap enrollees would reduce their use of services in response to 
changes in Medigap coverage, and that the Medicare program would therefore realize savings.  Because 
the size of the estimated savings is directly related to specific assumptions about likely enrollee 
behavior, an important question is what would happen if different assumptions were used. 
 
Exhibit 10 shows how three different behavioral assumptions would affect estimated per beneficiary 
costs for Medicare and for enrollees under Option 1, the plan that requires the enrollee to pay the first 
$550 in cost sharing and 50 percent of additional required cost sharing up to an out-of-pocket limit.  The 
three sets of assumptions are: 
• No change in behavior:  Beneficiaries continue using the same services, regardless of the changes in 
cost sharing. 
• A 5 percent reduction in use and spending:  This is roughly the change CBO has predicted in 
modeling similar options.24
• Income-based reductions in spending:  According to this assumption, upon which the estimates in 
this paper are based, lower-income enrollees would be more likely to curtail use of services than 
higher-income enrollees.  Under Option 1, the third of enrollees with the lowest incomes reduce 
spending by 9.2 percent, while the third of enrollees with the highest incomes reduce spending by 
6.4 percent.  (The source of these assumptions is discussed in Appendix A.) 
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Exhibit 10:  Changes in Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary and Beneficiary Costs for Option 1, 
Using Different Behavioral Assumptions 
  OPTION 1 results with-- 
 Base case (A) 
No change in 
behavior (B) 
5% reduction 
in spending (C) 
Income-based 
reductions in 
spending (D) 
(a) Medicare-approved amounts (=b+c) $9,262 $9,262 $8,799 $8,550 
(b) Medicare payments $7,724 $7,724 $7,358 $7,146 
(c) Required cost sharing (=d+e) $1,537 $1,537 $1,440 $1,404 
(d) Paid by Medigap $1,537 $648 $588 $566 
(e) Paid by enrollee  $0 $889 $852 $838 
(f) Medigap premium (=d/.775) $1,984 $836 $759 $731 
(e) Combined premium and OOP cost (=e+f) $1,984 $1,725 $1,611 $1,568 
(g) Average enrollee savings from base case n/a $258 $372 $415 
Medicare savings in FY 2011 (in billions) n/a $0.00 -$2.91 -$4.60 
As percent of Part A and Part B benefit 
spending (including spending for non-
Medigap beneficiaries) 
n/a 0.0% 0.6% 0.9% 
SOURCE:  Medicare savings based on author’s calculations, based on spending under Parts A and B for all Medicare 
beneficiaries. 
 
If Medigap enrollees made no change in their behavior at all (Column B results), there would be no 
savings to the Medicare program; it would still be paying for the same mix of services as before.  But the 
average enrollee would still have net savings, because the new cost-sharing expense of $889 (Column B, 
Row d) would be more than offset by the premium reduction ($1,984 - $836).25
 
  As suggested earlier, 
the exact size of the offset depends on the extent to which insurers pass on their own claims savings.  
But most consumers are likely to see at least some savings.  This fact is important when thinking about 
how enrollees might respond to Medigap policy changes and how total Medicare spending might be 
affected. 
Many studies have shown that increasing cost sharing in any kind of health insurance plan deters 
enrollees from obtaining some services.26  Two recent studies have focused specifically on Medicare 
beneficiaries.  In each study, the beneficiaries started out with supplemental plans that required low 
copayments for covered ambulatory services.  When the plans changed their benefits, requiring much 
higher copayments for ambulatory care, the enrollees’ utilization dropped sharply.27
 
  But there is a key 
difference between the situation faced by these enrollees and the one that would be faced by Medigap 
policyholders under the options considered here. 
In the studies cited, and in most similar analyses, the enrollees were faced with a new cost.  They either 
had to reduce their utilization, spend money that they were previously using for other household 
expenses, or draw on savings.  But the Medigap changes modeled here would merely retarget money 
that Medigap enrollees are already spending for medical care.  In effect, each enrollee is being handed a 
lump sum, in the form of a premium reduction.  The enrollee then has a choice of using this money to 
cover the new cost-sharing expenses or reducing use of medical services and spending the amount they 
saved on something else.  Certainly, many enrollees might choose to use their premium savings to meet 
other needs.  But others may not, and expectations of large Medicare savings resulting from Medigap 
restrictions may not be entirely realistic.  The estimates here, with savings ranging from 0.3 percent to 
0.9 percent of aggregate Part A and B spending, should probably be regarded as at the upper limit of 
possible savings. 
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Treatment of Employer Plans and Medicare Advantage Plans 
If the rationale for restrictions on Medigap coverage is that first-dollar coverage leads to inappropriate 
utilization, it would seem equitable to set the same rules for beneficiaries with other forms of 
supplemental coverage.  The Bowles-Simpson commission Medigap proposal would also apply to all 
employer-provided supplements, including the federal health programs for civilian and military retirees.  
As noted earlier, MedPAC has suggested that extending Option 1 to employer plans could double the 
Medicare savings.  It would also be conceivable to impose similar restrictions on Medicare Advantage 
plans.  But there are also arguments against restrictions on employer plans or MA plans. 
 
For retirees with employer-provided benefits (as opposed to Medicare-eligible active workers), 
Medicare is the primary payer: it pays the amount it would normally pay on any claim, leaving any 
required cost sharing to be paid by the employer, the beneficiary, or both.  Different employer plans 
have different ways of calculating what they will pay toward cost sharing.  Some usually pay cost sharing 
in full; this is the rule, for example, for Medicare-eligible annuitants under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits program.  Others contribute only the difference, if any, between Medicare’s payment and what 
the plan would have paid for the same service if the enrollee had not had Medicare.  Because these 
plans have their own cost-sharing requirements, they may pay nothing toward a Medicare-covered 
service.  The enrollee is left to pay the full Medicare cost sharing until he or she reaches the employer 
plan’s out-of-pocket limit.  While there do not appear to be any reliable data on how many employers 
use which method, benefits consultants indicate that the second approach is the more common one.28
 
   
This has a number of consequences.  First, many beneficiaries already have something less than first-
dollar coverage from their employer plans.  This is reflected in the MedPAC study cited earlier, which 
shows that employer-provided supplemental coverage has less apparent effect on utilization than 
Medigap.  And the number of retirees with very generous coverage is likely to drop as employers 
continue to look for ways of controlling the costs of benefits for current or future retirees. 
 
Second, setting uniform benefit rules for retiree plans is likely to be very complex.  Nearly everyone with 
Medigap is already getting one of a limited set of standardized plans, and tweaking the rules for these 
plans is fairly straightforward.  But applying, for example, the CBO option to employer plans would be 
much more complex.  What if a plan has a lower deductible than the proposal requires but a higher out-
of-pocket limit?  What if a plan’s rules for coordinating its benefits with Medicare mean that it helps pay 
for some Medicare-covered services and not for others?  It is hard to see how one could fairly regulate 
employer plans without moving toward standardization.  An alternative might be some sort of actuarial 
equivalency test, under which the employer would show that retirees were paying at least as much of 
their own cost sharing as they would under the reformed Medigap plans.  But this would still be 
complicated and burdensome to administer. 
 
Finally, many retirees with generous Medicare supplemental coverage bargained for that coverage in 
lieu of other compensation.  This argument is often raised in the context of discussions of possible 
changes in the tax treatment of employer-sponsored coverage.  It is also one of the criticisms leveled at 
the excise tax on high-cost employer plans included in the ACA.  But a key difference is that, if employers 
respond to the new excise tax by curtailing health benefits, active workers can negotiate other 
compensation—an offsetting wage increase or improvements in other benefits.  Retirees, on the other 
hand, can no longer negotiate.  If benefits under their Medicare supplement are reduced, they cannot 
make this up in some other way. 
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Imposing benefit restrictions on Medicare Advantage plans might seem fair, but would have little direct 
effect on federal spending.  Most Medicare Advantage plans do offer reduced cost sharing for basic 
Medicare benefits.  However, if the reduced cost sharing offered by an Medicare Advantage plan leads 
to higher utilization of these benefits, it is the plan and not the federal government that bears the cost.  
(In fact, plans that waive cost sharing are required to adjust their bids to assure that Medicare does not 
pay for any resulting induced demand.)  Moreover, most plans are supposed to have some way of 
managing costs other than simply deterring utilization through cost sharing.  So it may be more sensible 
to go on letting the market determine the mix of supplemental benefits that MA plans offer. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Restrictions on first-dollar coverage under Medigap plans could produce some savings for the Medicare 
program by deterring some beneficiaries from accessing medical care.  For the most restrictive option, 
the savings could approach 1 percent of total Part A and B spending.  This finding should be viewed with 
caution.  As was suggested earlier, projections of utilization changes in response to benefit redesigns are 
highly speculative.  And it is unclear whether changes in care-seeking behavior would produce one-time 
savings for Medicare or have an ongoing effect on spending growth.  To the extent that Medicare 
spending growth is driven by the adoption of costly new medical technologies, physicians’ decision-
making may be at least as important as consumers’ choices. 
 
Policy changes must also be considered in the light of potential effects on beneficiaries.  The analysis 
here suggests that most beneficiaries would gain financially from more restrictive coverage, because 
their increased cost sharing for covered services would be offset by Medigap premium reductions.  But 
as many as one in five enrollees could see cost increases—in some cases $1,000 or more per year.  
Enrollees facing higher net costs are disproportionately those in fair or poor health, those requiring 
inpatient hospital care, and those with modest incomes.  Even enrollees who do not actually see an 
increase in their total costs could be thought of as suffering a “welfare loss.”  Beneficiaries buy 
comprehensive insurance in part for the peace of mind of knowing that they are fully protected against 
unpredictable events.  They may see the loss of this protection as outweighing any potential premium 
savings.      
 
Perhaps more important, there is no way of ensuring that enrollees who might reduce their utilization 
would forgo only services of questionable value.  The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which 
randomly assigned participants to insurance plans with different levels of cost sharing, found that those 
facing higher cost sharing did indeed use fewer services.  But they were as likely to go without services 
that experts deemed highly effective as services deemed ineffective.29  The RAND experiment was 
conducted many years ago and did not include the elderly.  However, more recent studies of the effects 
of cost-sharing on elderly people have shown reduced use of necessary services and poorer health 
outcomes.  Most of these studies have focused on cost-sharing for prescription drugs, which is not 
affected by the proposals analyzed here.30  But at least one study focusing on ambulatory care suggests 
that enrollees with chronic conditions could defer necessary services—perhaps leading to even higher 
costs in the long run.31
 
  More research is needed before it can be concluded that Medigap changes will 
not adversely affect the health of beneficiaries.  
In the coming years, Medicare will be experimenting with new payment mechanisms meant to change 
financial incentives for providers and encourage reforms in the way medical care is organized and 
delivered.  One option is bundled payment, a single payment to a provider for all services related to a 
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specific disease or condition during some fixed period.  Another is to encourage development of 
accountable care organizations (ACOs), networks of physicians and other providers that would accept 
responsibility for overall care of a population of Medicare patients.  The ACO program will begin with an 
arrangement under which ACOs and Medicare will share in any savings resulting from more cost-
effective care, but many expect that it will eventually evolve into a capitated system.   
 
None of these options work well with a cost-sharing structure that is designed for an entirely fee-for-
service system.  If a doctor/hospital team receives a single bundled payment for total care of a heart 
attack, does the beneficiary pay 20 percent of this amount?  If ACOs are going to be capitated to provide 
total care for a beneficiary for a month, what is the beneficiary going to pay?  New payment systems are 
meant to give the providers incentives to avoid delivering unnecessary services.  Using cost sharing to 
induce beneficiaries to reduce utilization still further could jeopardize quality.  Policymakers considering 
changes in Medigap rules will need to consider how Medigap fits into broader efforts to control the 
growth of Medicare spending. 
 
Medigap enrollment is likely to grow in the coming years, for at least two reasons.  First, the Affordable 
Care Act changed the payment formulas for Medicare Advantage (MA) plans; future payment reductions 
may mean that some beneficiaries will lose access to MA options.  Or MA plans may curtail 
supplemental benefits or raise premiums, reducing their competitive advantage over conventional 
Medigap.  In addition, while many current Medicare beneficiaries have retiree benefits from their 
former employers, this coverage is likely to erode.  Fewer employers are promising future benefits to 
their active workers, and rising costs may lead some employers to abandon coverage even for current 
retirees, perhaps replacing their plans with subsidies for individual purchase of Medigap and Part D 
plans. 
 
These trends may mean that a steadily growing share of beneficiaries will be relying on Medigap for 
their supplemental coverage.  If these new purchasers, like existing Medigap enrollees, prefer the more 
comprehensive plans, this could mean some upward pressure on utilization.  Potential Medicare savings 
from restricting benefits might be higher than suggested in CBO’s projections or in this brief.  But 
increasing reliance on Medigap also makes it all the more pressing that redesign of Medigap benefits be 
coordinated with other Medicare reforms.  Medigap issues should be considered in the context of a 
broader reevaluation of the structure of Medicare benefits and a possible realignment of overall 
financial incentives for both providers and beneficiaries. 
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APPENDIX A:  INFORMATION ON MEDICARE BENEFITS AND MEDIGAP PLANS 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Medigap Plan Benefits, 2011
NOTES: Check marks indicate 100 percent benefit coverage.  Amount in table is the plan’s coinsurance amount for each covered benefit after 
beneficiary pays deductibles or cost-sharing amounts, where applicable.  *Plan N pays 100% of the Part B coinsurance except up to $20 
copayment for office visits and up to $50 for emergency department visits.  
SOURCE: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2011 Guide to Health Insurance, March 2011.
BENEFITS
MEDIGAP POLICY
A B C D F G K L M N
Medicare Part A Coinsurance and all costs after hospital 
benefits are exhausted          
Medicare Part B Coinsurance or Copayment for other than 
preventive services       50% 75%  *
Blood (first 3 pints)       50% 75%  
Hospice Care Coinsurance or Copayment   50% 75%  
Skilled Nursing Facility Care Coinsurance     50% 75%  
Medicare Part A Deductible      50% 75% 50% 
Medicare Part B Deductible  
Medicare Part B Excess Charges  
Foreign Travel Emergency (Up to Plan Limits)*      
At-Home Recovery (Up to Plan Limits)  
Medicare Preventive Care Part B Coinsurance          
Preventive Care not Covered by Medicare (up to $120)
Out-of-Pocket Limit $4,620 $2,310
Exhibit A1
Distribution of Medigap Policyholders 
by All Plan Types, 2009
Plan A
3%
Plan B
3%
Plan C
15%
Plan D
4%
Plan E
2%
Plan F
41%
Plan G
4%
Plan H
1%
Plan I
2%
Plan J
10%
Plan K
< 1%
Plan L
<1%
PreStandardization
10%
Other
5%
Total Number of Medigap Policyholders, 2009 = 8.5 million 
NOTE:  Analysis includes standardized plans A-L, policies existing prior to federal standardization, and plans in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin that are not part of the federal standardization program; does not include companies and plans that identified as Medicare Select;  
excludes companies and plans where sum of premiums or number of covered lives was less than or equal to zero; negative claims set at 0.  
Although plans H, I, and J are no longer offered, enrollees who had purchased these plans can remain in them.
SOURCE:  K. Desmond and Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Medicare 
Supplement data; unpublished. CMS Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement: Medicare Enrollment 2009, released September 30, 2010 
Exhibit A2
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Exhibit A3:  Medicare Benefits* and Cost-Sharing Requirements, 2011 
PART A 
Deductible $1,132 per benefit period 
Inpatient hospital  
 Days 1-60 No coinsurance 
 Days 61-90 $283 per day 
 Days 91-150 $566 per day (for up to 60 lifetime reserve days) 
 After 150 Days Not covered 
Skilled nursing facility   
 Days 1-20 No coinsurance 
 Days 21-100 $141.50 per day 
 After 100 Days Not covered 
Home Health No coinsurance; no limit on number of visits 
Hospice  No coinsurance for hospice care; copayment of up to $5 for 
outpatient drugs and 5% coinsurance for inpatient respite care 
Inpatient psychiatric hospital Up to 190 days in a lifetime 
PART B 
Deductible $162 
Premium $115.40/month; higher for those with incomes above 
$85,000/single or $170,000/couple; $96.40/month for those held 
harmless from the premium increase since 2009; $110.50/month 
for those held harmless from the premium increase since 2010. 
Physician and other medical services      
MD accepts assignment 20% coinsurance  
MD does not accept assignment 20% coinsurance, plus up to 15% above the Medicare-approved fee 
Outpatient hospital care 20% coinsurance 
Ambulatory surgical services 20% coinsurance 
Diagnostic tests, X-rays, and lab services 20% coinsurance 
Durable medical equipment 20% coinsurance 
Physical, occupational, and speech therapy 20% coinsurance; certain limits may apply 
Clinical laboratory services No coinsurance 
Home health care No coinsurance; no limit on number of visits 
Outpatient mental health services 45% coinsurance (phasing down to 20% in 2014) 
One-time "Welcome to Medicare" physical exam 20% coinsurance; covered within first 12 months of Part B 
enrollment; Part B deductible does not apply 
Preventive services*  
 Flu shot, Pneumococcal shot No coinsurance; limit of one flu shot per flu season 
 Hepatitis B shot, colorectal and prostate cancer 
 screening, pap smear, mammogram, cardiovascular 
 screening, abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) screening, 
 bone mass measurement, diabetes screening and 
 monitoring, glaucoma screening, smoking cessation 
20% coinsurance after annual Part B deductible is met;  
however, Part B deductible and coinsurance are waived for some 
preventive services  
PART D 
Information below applies to the standard Part D benefit; benefits and cost-sharing requirements typically vary across plans.  
Beneficiaries receiving low-income subsidies pay reduced cost-sharing amounts. 
Deductible $310 
Premium $32.34 national average monthly premium  
(unweighted PDP and MA-PD plan average) 
Initial coverage (up to $2,840 in total drug costs) 25% coinsurance 
Coverage gap (between $2,840 and $6,448 in total drug 
costs) 
50% coinsurance for brand-name drugs, 93% coinsurance for 
generic drugs, phasing down to 25% in 2020 
Catastrophic coverage (above $4,550 in out-of-pocket 
spending) 
Minimum of $2.50/generic, $6.30/brand; or 5% coinsurance 
NOTES: *This table does not include all Medicare-covered benefits or preventive services; for a complete listing, see 
http://www.medicare.gov/Coverage/Home.asp and http://www.medicare.gov/Health/Overview.asp. 
SOURCES:  CMS, www.medicare.gov, Medicare & You 2011, Your Guide to Medicare’s Preventive Services. 
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APPENDIX B: DATA AND METHODS 
Data used in the modeling for this brief are derived from the 2006 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), adjusted using 
information from several other sources (discussed below).32
 
  The MEPS interviews a nationally 
representative sample of households and collects information on demographic characteristics, health 
status, use of medical services, charges and payments for care, health insurance coverage, and other 
characteristics.   
Spending and Cost Sharing 
The MEPS understates Medicare utilization and spending for certain categories of service.  Data were 
adjusted using AHRQ’s own reconciliation of MEPS and the National Health Expenditure Accounts and 
further corrected to match 2006 CMS administrative data.33  The MEPS contains no information on the 
use of skilled nursing facility (SNF) services.  SNF use and spending by enrollees with inpatient hospital 
admissions have been imputed using odds ratios derived from a CMS study of post-acute care use.34 
Medicare payment estimates were converted to allowable amounts using cost-sharing estimates 
developed by CMS for use in the 2006 Medicare Advantage bidding process.35
 
  All amounts were 
updated to FY 2011 using the CBO’s benchmark estimates from March 2007 and March 2011. 
Enrollment 
Comparison with data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and other sources indicates 
that there is some under- or misreporting of Medicare beneficiaries’ supplemental coverage.  To correct 
for this, participants reporting individual Medigap were reweighted to match distributions of Medigap 
enrollees by age, income, health status, and Medicare spending in the 2006 MCBS.  Enrollment 
estimates have not been updated to 2011, because there is no information on recent changes in 
supplemental coverage.  The model therefore reflects estimated 2011 spending and cost sharing for the 
2006 Medigap population.  Characteristics of this population are shown in Exhibit B1. 
Exhibit B1:  Characteristics of Medigap Enrollees, 2006 
  Number of enrollees (weighted) Percent of total 
Age 
Under 65 274,745 3% 
65-74 3,546,764 45% 
75-84 2,907,148 37% 
85+ 1,215,257 15% 
Reported health status 
Excellent 1,463,955 18% 
Very good 2,383,195 30% 
Good 2,582,861 33% 
Fair 1,119,257 14% 
Poor 337,539 4% 
Family income as a 
percent of poverty 
Under 200% 3,635,552 46% 
200%-299% 2,002,642 25% 
300%-399% 897,151 11% 
400% and over 1,408,569 18% 
Total  7,943,915 100% 
SOURCE: Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, Cost and Use file, 2006.  
Family income estimates from reweighted 2006 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data. 
NOTE: Includes all Medicare beneficiaries who had individually purchased Medigap at any time in 2006 and who 
were not also enrolled in Medicaid, an employer plan, or a Medicare Advantage plan during the year. 
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Premiums 
Premiums for Medigap coverage in the base case are estimated on the assumption that the plan covers 
all required cost sharing for Medicare Part A and B services.  (Some components of cost sharing, such as 
coinsurance for very long hospital stays, are omitted from the estimates, because these events are too 
rare in the MEPS sample.  As a result, premiums are somewhat understated.)  For the base case and all 
options, it is assumed that every policy has a loss ratio of 77.5 percent.  This is the average ratio 
reported to the NAIC in 2009 for individual policies that had been in force since 2006 or earlier.36
Exhibit B2:  Estimated Base Case Premiums, by Age 
  
(Newly issued policies tend to have much higher loss ratios at the outset.)  Premiums are established on 
an attained age basis for four age groups.  Base case premiums are shown in Exhibit B2.  Note that 
because MEPS public use data include almost no geographic information, these premiums are based on 
national weighted averages for beneficiaries in the age group.  Of course, actual Medigap premiums vary 
by geography.  This would not likely affect the estimates of overall average Medicare and individual 
savings under the reform options in the analysis, but would affect the classification of individual cases as 
“winners” and “losers”—those whose cost sharing is or is not fully offset by premium reductions. 
Age Base premium, FY 2011 
Under age 65 $1,201 
65-74 $1,600 
75-84 $2,276 
85 and older $2,579 
 
Behavioral Factors 
Policy options that reduce coverage, exposing participants to higher OOP costs, are assumed to reduce 
the likelihood that enrollees will use any Medicare-covered services during the year, as well as the 
amount of services obtained by those who do use services.  Estimates of these effects use factors 
derived from the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) conducted by the RAND Corporation in the 1970s.  
HIE participants were randomly assigned to a full, first-dollar plan and to plans that imposed various levels 
of copayment—including one that required participants to pay nearly all their expenses until they reached 
an OOP limit.  Random assignment meant that the researchers could set aside people’s preference about 
what kind of insurance to buy and look directly at how different levels of coverage affected use.  As 
expected, higher cost sharing did deter people from obtaining care.  However, it made the greatest 
difference to poor people, especially poor children; higher-income participants were not much affected.37
 
   
Much has changed in insurance and in medical care since the 1970s.  Moreover, the HIE did not include 
elderly people, and some analysts think they might behave differently from the nonelderly.  Still, there 
appears to be no other source for income-based estimates of changes in demand in response to changes in 
cost sharing.  For the estimates in this brief it is assumed that, for each 1 percent increase in the share of 
Medicare allowed amounts paid by the enrollee under the different options, the allowed amounts are 
reduced as shown in Exhibit B3.38
Exhibit B3:  Estimated Spending Reduction for Each One Percent Increase in Share of Costs 
Paid by Beneficiaries 
 
Income class Spending reduction 
Lowest third of Medicare households 0.961% 
Middle third 0.764% 
Highest third 0.666% 
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